





















*This paper has benefited from the discussions at the conference “The Next Negotiating Round: 
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  According to a proposal, made for the first time in print by Martin Wolf in the Financial 
Times but also advocated independently by many others, the WTO should set a target date for 
achieving full free trade.
1  The Seattle Round should aim to give concrete shape to this proposal by 
setting an explicit timetable for the removal of the remaining barriers to trade. 
  There are many reasons for setting a target date for free trade as a part of the Seattle-Round 
agenda but two of them are worth mentioning at the outset.  First, GATT, the predecessor institution 
of WTO, was created to liberalize border trade and it is in this area that it has been most successful 
in the last several decades.  With substantial trade liberalization already achieved, a target date for 
complete free trade is a natural way to bring this process to a speedy conclusion.  Trade 
liberalization benefits each country as a whole.  Moreover, when undertaken on a multilateral basis, 
it generates mainly efficiency effects and minimal redistributive effects.  These characteristics make 
trade liberalization relatively uncontroversial.  The same is not true of a good deal of “non-trade” 
agenda, which generates efficiency effects of a dubious nature and large redistributive effects, often 
from developing to developed countries.
2 
Second, the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in recent years has 
substantially undermined the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle of trade policy.  For instance, 
                                                 
1 Several economists from around the world endorsed the idea in a letter to the editor in the Financial Times, 
June 25, 1996, developing the rationale for such a target more fully.  This letter is reproduced in the appendix. 
2 For example, see my paper, “TRIPs and the WTO: An Uneasy Marriage,” in this volume. 
 today, the European Union applies its MFN tariff to barely six countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, 
New Zealand, Taiwan and the United States) which account for approximately one third of its total 
imports.
3  Tariffs on products from all other countries differ from the MFN tariff in one or the other 
way. 
  There are now so many Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs) such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union's numerous association agreements that a 
virtual "spaghetti bowl" of crisscrossing preferential trade barriers has come to exist.  In member 
countries of these PTAs, different duties apply to different trading partners depending on the origin 
assigned to the imported product and the stage of liberalization within a particular PTA. 
  We therefore run the risk of reproducing the chaos created by the absence of the MFN status 
during the 1930s, produced then by protectionism but now, ironically, by free-trade intentions.   
Given the politics that often drives these PTAs, any attempts at reducing their spread do not seem to 
be likely to succeed.  The worldwide achievement of free trade would seem to be the most effective 
remedy for eliminating this chaos.  The reason is that preferences relative to zero duties are zero: 
preference would be effectively killed at source. 
  A principal advantage of PTAs, which seems to attract trade-oriented businesses in 
particular, is that they offer target dates that will lead on schedule to ultimate free trade, albeit within 
a limited area.  By contrast, the GATT/WTO process goes from one Round of multilateral trade 
negotiation to another, the end of a Round never linked for sure to the start of another, as was in fact 




3 See Sapir (1998). the case again with the end of the Uruguay Round.  Adoption of a target date at the Seattle Round 
can eliminate this disadvantage of multilateral route to liberalization vis-à-vis the preferential route. 
This paper discusses the feasibility of achieving the goal of free trade in industrial and 
agricultural goods.  Strictly speaking, border barriers such as tariffs and quotas apply to trade in 
these areas only.  Trade liberalization in services is linked intimately to domestic regulatory 
policies.   While trade liberalization in services has to be a part of the overall “free trade” objective 
but, in the present paper, I limit myself to the liberalization of border barriers and hence industry 
and agriculture.  Only brief remarks are made towards the end on the liberalization of cross-border 
trade in services via electronic means. 
One qualification to any proposal for free trade by a certain date must be acknowledged at 
the outset.  It is impractical to expect that a single date for the achievement of free trade can be 
adopted across all products and all countries.  Given that liberalization of industrial products is 
currently much farther along than liberalization of agricultural goods, free trade in the former can be 
achieved sooner than in the latter.
4  Likewise, at least for the least developed countries, the date will 
have to be farther into the future than for developed countries.
5  Indeed, the achievement of a 
                                                 
4 I should note that, at the conference, Ruebens Ricupero, Secretary General of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), reacted sharply to the suggestion that free trade in 
agriculture be placed behind industrial products.  Given deep Latin American interest in exporting 
agricultural products freely to the European Union and the United States, such a disagreement from Ricupero 
is to be expected.  The view expressed in the paper is essentially based on the reality that WTO members, 
including those in Latin America, have already accepted faster liberalization in industrial products than in 
agriculture.  If future negotiations can yield the same date for free trade in agriculture as in industrial 




5 At the conference, Martin Khor, Director, Third World Network, voiced the concern that positive benefits 
from free trade had not been conclusively shown to exist, which raise the question why developing countries 
should subject themselves to the adjustment costs that trade liberalization brings.  On the benefits of free consensus may require three different dates, one each for developed, least developed and remaining 
developing countries.  This will be broadly consistent with the Bogor declaration by the members of 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which set two separate dates for free trade in 
developed and developing countries: 2010 for the former and 2020 for the latter.  An alternative 
model can be the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which was essentially a plurilateral 
agreement.  A core group of countries could agree on free trade by certain dates on an MFN basis.  
Other countries can join this agreement as it becomes possible for them to do so. 
2.  Free Trade in Industrial Goods
6 
If we go by average levels of tariffs in developed countries, it may seem that there is little room left 
for further negotiations in industrial goods.  Tables 1a-1c report the post-Uruguay-Round tariff rates 
in broad product categories in the United States, European Union and Japan, respectively.
7  These 
three together account for 85% of developed-country imports.  According to the tables, the average 
tariff rate is 3.5 percent in the United States, 3.6 percent in EU and 1.7 percent in Japan.  One may 
be inclined to think that these tariffs are so low that it will be a waste of effort to focus on 
liberalization in industrial goods.
 8 
                                                                                                                                                             
trade, the author disagrees with Khor but the issue of adjustment costs is a real one.  Given the absence of 
social-safety nets and, in many cases, a lack of industrialization, adjustment costs in developing countries are 
high.  This concern can be addressed through later dates for free trade by developing and least developed 
countries. 
6 The companion paper by Gillespie and Low (1999), presented at the conference, offers further details on the 
existing structure of tariffs in developed and developing countries. 
7The post-UR tariffs were to be implemented in five equal, annual installments starting on January 1, 1995 





8The calculations are from UNCTAD using GATT Secretariat's Integrated Data Base (IDB) in which 44 
countries (counting 12 European Community members as one) participated.  The IDB comprises (i) data on Yet, it can be argued that there is a considerable room for a North-South bargain in tariffs in 
industrial goods alone.  In the case of goods exported by developing countries, developed countries 
still have relatively high tariffs.  Developing countries, on the other hand, have high tariffs in 
general and are, therefore, able to offer increased market access to developed countries. 
Thus, once we get past the average rates, there is a considerable variation in tariff rates in 
developed countries both across categories and across subcategories within each broad category.  
Across categories, in the United States, out of the 11 categories shown in Table 1a, eight have an 
average tariff rate of 2.8% or less.  But the tariff rate on textiles and clothing averages 14.6 percent 
and that on leather, rubber and footwear is 7.6 percent.  Both of these product groups are of 
considerable interest to developing countries.  A similar pattern holds for Japan with tariff rates on 
the two categories of products averaging 7.6 and 8.3 percent, respectively.  In EU, the high tariff 
categories are textiles and clothing (9.1 percent) and fish and fish products (10.2 percent). 
  Within each broad category, there is a considerable further variation in tariff rates.  Some of 
the peak tariff rates are as high as 35%.  Thus, in the United States, using 1989 import data that 
formed the basis of Uruguay Round (UR) liberalization, 52% of textiles and clothing imports are 
subject to tariff rates ranging from 15.1 to 35%.  Even though 40% of all 1989 U.S. imports are duty 
free at the post-UR tariff rates, there are no textiles and clothing imports that are duty free.  In EU, 
9.1% of 1988 imports are subject to post-UR rates exceeding 10%.  In Japan, where 71% of 1988 




tariff commitments made by participants on all tariff lines in their schedules pre- and post-Uruguay Round 
and (ii) imports by origin denominated in the U.S. dollars on a tariff line basis.  The base year for tariffs is 
1986 and for imports either 1988 or 1989 with a few exceptions.  Import data for the United States relate to 
1989 and those for EU and Japan to1988. imports become duty free under the post-UR tariff rates, the corresponding proportion at 2.7% for 
textiles and clothing is much smaller. 
  Table 1d provides post-UR tariff rates for member countries of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, which includes the United States and Japan.  The classification in this 
Table is slightly different than in Tables 1a-1c.  Once again, however, textiles and wearing apparel 
have consistently high tariff rates.  In addition, in many developing Asian countries, tariffs on many 
other products imported from developed countries are in excess of 10%.  For example, in Indonesia, 
post-UR tariff rates on non-ferrous metals, fabricated metals, transport equipment, machinery and 
other manufacturing are all higher than 10%.  The rate on other manufacturing is as high as 28.6%.  
Even in Korea, which is among less protected developing Asian countries, non-ferrous metals and 
fabricated metals have post-UR tariff rates of more than 11%.  Other manufacturing is subject to 
8.8% tariffs.  Post-UR tariff rates offered by China, which is not a member of WTO currently but is 
expected to become and will be a negotiating party in a future round, are uniformly high.  The rates 
are almost 70% and 45% in transport equipment and other manufacturing, respectively.  In India, 
which is yet another large and rapidly expanding market, the peak tariff rate is 50% while the 
average tariff rate exceeds 25%. 
  These post-UR tariff rates leave a considerable room for further liberalization in industrial 
products.  For the structure of tariff rates in developed and developing countries, it will appear that 
the next round of negotiations will be essentially between developed and developing countries.  
Beyond a few provisions for the least developed countries, the UR Round more or less did away 
with the approach of giving a "special and differential" treatment to developing countries.  The next 
 
 
 6 round could complete this process by turning the tariff negotiations in industrial products into a 
North-South round. 
  Because tariffs are substantially higher in developing than developed countries, it may seem 
that the former will end up giving more concessions than they will receive. This, in turn, may make 
the bargain uneven.  There are four arguments in favor of such liberalization, however.  First, the 
developed-country markets are much larger than developing-country markets.  Therefore, a 1% 
tariff reduction by the former, especially in products of interest to developing countries, is worth 
more than a similar reduction by the latter.  Even if the extent of additional liberalization by 
developed countries is smaller, the gains to the developing countries may be larger.  Second, if a 
further round of multilateral trade negotiations is delayed, being individually small, developing 
countries are likely to carry out a substantial liberalization on a unilateral basis anyway.  Therefore, 
it may be in their self-interest to push for a negotiation that promises to bring additional access to 
developed-country markets.  Third, some of the gains from liberalization may occur from 
liberalization among developing countries themselves.  A substantial trade of developing countries 
today is with oth3er developing countries.  There is no reason to forgo the benefits of liberalization 
among themselves.  Finally, there is also room for exchanging market access in industrial products 
for market access in agriculture.  For instance, for the Carnes Group countries in Latin America, 
large benefits may accrue from giving access in industrial products in return for agricultural goods. 
  The proposal for a North-South bargain made here is to be distinguished sharply from the 
one made by Fred Bergsten of the Institute of International Economics prior to the Singapore 
Ministerial Conference.  Bergsten proposed the so-called "grand bargain" in which "the old rich 
 
 
 7 pledge to avoid new barriers while the rapid growers commit to eliminate theirs."
9  (Here "rapid 
growers" refers to developing countries, especially in Asia.)  In am afraid the bargain proposed by 
Bergsten is "grand" for developed countries alone and hardly a "bargain" for the developing 
countries.  It is not clear how a "pledge to avoid new barriers" by one set of countries can be 
bartered for actual reduction in barriers by other countries. The "pledge" would be of some value if 
the countries offered to outlaw or at least limit substantially the use of some of the existing 
instruments of protection such as antidumping and undertook to substantially remove the tariffs on 
sectors that continue to be protected.  But, consistent with the official position of the United States 
at the time, Bergsten's proposal included no such offers and, under the guise of a grand bargain, 
effectively sought one-way concessions from developing countries. 
3.  Free Trade in Agriculture 
  As already noted in the introduction, complete free trade in agriculture is a more distant goal 
than that in industrial goods.  Nevertheless, since the current level of protection in this sector is very 
high, it offers considerable benefits from liberalization.  The UR Agreement on Agriculture had 
three main components: increases in import market access, reductions in farm export subsidies, and 
cuts in domestic producer subsidies.  In addition, other UR agreements, particularly, the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the Agreement on Technical 




     9 Bergsten, F. 1996, "Globalizing Free Trade," Foreign Affairs 75(3): 105-20.  Bergsten also proposes in 
this article worldwide free trade by a certain date but is not entirely clear on the relationship between it and 
his "grand bargain." Presumably, he intended the "grand bargain" is intended to be the first step toward 
complete free trade. Barriers to Trade, have a bearing on trade in agriculture.  The new round must make progress along 
each of these dimensions. 
3.1 Market  Access 
  The Agreement on Agriculture required that, taking 1986-88 as the base period, all non-
tariff barriers be converted into tariff equivalents.
10  These tariff equivalents were to be added to the 
existing tariffs and the total tariff bound.  The bound tariffs were then to be reduced by 36% on 
average with the rate on each item reduced by at least 15 percent by developed countries by January 
1, 2000.  Developing countries were to reduce tariffs by 15% on average and at least 10% on each 
item and were given until January 1, 2005 to accomplish the task.
11 
  According to the available measures, tariff equivalents for the base period 1986-88 chosen 
by Members are far higher than the "true" tariff equivalents.  Table 2a presents these calculations for 
EU and the United States.  As shown in the fourth column, the proportion by which the announced 
base tariff rate exceeds the actual tariff rate (i.e., "dirty tariffication") is 61% for EU and 44% for the 
United States. 
  The second column in Table 2a shows the final tariff bindings for the major agricultural 
products in EU and the United States.  In addition, Table 2b provides the rates for all APEC 
members using a slightly different classification than in Table 2a.  For many products, post-UR 
                                                 
     
10Japan and the Republic of Korea got exemption in rice and developing countries in commodities that are 




     
11The average cut is calculated in a way that leaves a considerable flexibility.  Tangermann (1994) offers 
the following interesting example.  In a developed country, if there are four items of which three have 100% 
tariffs and one 4%, a 15% reduction in the former and the elimination of the latter yields (15+15+15+100)/4 
= 36.25% average reduction and satisfies the requirement.  rates in developed as well as developing countries are extremely high.  Thus, there is a substantial 
room for further negotiations scheduled to begin by January 1, 2000. 
  The Agreement on Agriculture also introduces minimum access requirements in products 
subject to import restrictions.  The share of imports in domestic consumption of restricted items 
must rise to at least 5% by 2000 under a tariff quota.  To fulfill the minimum import quota 
commitment, the Agreement on Agriculture stipulated that countries adopt a two-tier tariff structure.  
Accordingly, a `lower' tariff rate (a maximum of 32 percent of the bound tariff rates) was to be set 
for the quota imports while the higher `bound' rate was to be applied to the rest of imports.  As 
expected, the tariff quota has opened the door to discrimination.  There are no clear rules on how the 
quota should be allocated.  The minimum access requirement can also be evaded by importing low-
quality items and then re-exporting them as food aid.
12 
  A key aim of the Seattle Round should be an immediate unification of the bound tariff and 
the rate applicable to the tariff quota, with the latter eliminated entirely.  Minimally, the bound tariff 
on each item should be brought down immediately to a level that will permit imports at the UR 
levels to continue.  In view of the fact that safeguard measures can be generally invoked to deal with 
unexpectedly large expansion of imports, there is no reason to limit imports through quantitative 
restrictions.  If some country ends up unifying the rates at levels that prove more restrictive than the 
tariff quota, compensation provisions can be built into the agreement at some penalty rate, thereby 
discouraging it from fixing the bound rate at an excessively high level. 




12 See Yap (1996).   In addition to this immediate action, the Seattle Round should also aim to draw a timetable 
of phased freeing up of trade in agriculture.  Admittedly, the date by which tariffs are brought down 
to zero may be far into the future but it will be worthwhile to have such a date agreed.  This will 
minimize adjustment costs and, hopefully, also discourage countries from forming discriminatory 
PTAs in agriculture. 
3.2 Export  Subsidies 
  The Agreement on Agriculture bans new export subsidies but allows the old ones to exist.  
Budget outlays on export subsidies are to be cut by 36% in developed countries and 24% in 
developing countries.  The volume of subsidized exports of each commodity is to be cut, in the case 
of developed countries, by 21% between 1995 and 2000 and, in the case of developing countries, by 
14% between 1995 to 2004 relative to their 1986-90 base-period averages.  
  The UR Agreement left the existing export subsidies untouched.  This will have to be taken 
up in the next round.  In addition, the provisions relating to budgetary outlay and volume of 
subsidized exports should be further tightened.  Indeed, the eventual aim of the next round should 
be to bring export subsidy provisions in agriculture in line with those applicable to industrial 
products. 
3.3 Domestic  Support 
  The Agreement on Agriculture also sought to reduce the aggregate level of domestic support 
extended to agriculture.  This was to be done by first computing the total domestic support extended 
to agriculture in the base years (1986-1988) in every country (termed as the `Aggregate Measure of 
 
 
 11 Support' or AMS).  Second, AMS was to be capped at existing levels.  Finally AMS was to be 
reduced by 20 percent over a six-year period in developed countries and by 13% over a ten-year 
period in developing countries.  It is important to highlight that AMS applies at an aggregate level 
and not to individual commodities.  This means that countries have considerable flexibility in 
choosing the level of support they wish to extend to any particular commodity as long as the 
obligations towards the overall ceilings are met.  Furthermore, the deminimus provision allows 
countries to exclude from the calculation of AMS (a) product specific support if it does not exceed 5 
percent of the value of production of that commodity, and (b) non-product specific support where it 
does not exceed 5 percent of the value of the country's total agriculture production.  For developing 
countries, the deminimus level is 10 percent.  Specified agricultural input subsidies are also 
excluded from AMS (Article 6.2 and 6.4). 
  The next round must continue the task of reducing the AMS, perhaps eventually eliminating 
it. The Agreement on Agriculture allowed exclusion of two important agriculture support payments 
programs in calculating AMS, the EU compensation program under the 1992 CAP reforms and the 
US deficiency program.  The next round must bring them into the fold of AMS calculations as well. 
4. Concluding  Remarks   
A key objective of the next round should be to achieve free trade in industrial products in a 
relatively short period of time, say, by the year 2010 for developed and 2020 for most developing 
countries.  Least developed countries could choose a longer time period.  The major restrictions in 
industrial products that remain in developed countries relate to products exported by developing 
countries.  Since developing countries themselves have barriers in products of interest to developed 
 
 
 12 countries, there is room for a mutually beneficial bargain between them.  Developing countries 
could also benefit from liberalization among themselves. 
  Trade barriers in agriculture are far more substantial than in industrial products.  This means 
that full free trade in this sector will take longer.  Nevertheless, the next round should consider 
setting a date for achieving the goal, with a considerable liberalization still achieved within short to 
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 14  
Appendix 
Text of the Letter Published in the 
Financial Times, June 25, 1996 
  Sir, Recently, the idea that the WTO should have a target, such as 2015, to achieve 
worldwide free trade has been proposed independently by many, among them principally by Martin 
Wolf in your newspaper.  It has been endorsed recently by Mr. Donald Johnston, Secretary General, 
OECD, and by the UK’s trade secretary Ian Lang. There have also been indications of interest in the 
proposal by Mr. Renato Ruggiero, Director General, WTO. 
  As economists deeply interested in the future of the world trading system, and keeping in 
view the first WTO ministerial in December in Singapore and the opportunity it presents for 
undertaking a significant initiative on trade, we and a group of economists worldwide would like to 
lend our support to the idea and to urge the member states of the WTO to make the endorsement of 
such a WTO target their first priority.  Among its advantages, a few are significant. 
  While consistent with Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, there are 
now so many Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs) such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and the European Union's numerous FTAs with other countries, that a virtual "spaghetti 
bowl" of crisscrossing preferential trade barriers has arisen, with different duties applying 
depending on which country the product being imported is assigned to. 
  We are therefore in danger of reproducing the chaos created by the absence of most 
favoured nation status during the 1930s, produced then by protectionism but now, ironically, by 
 
 
 15 free-trade intentions.  Given the politics that often drives these PTAs, any attempts at reducing their 
spread do not seem to be likely to succeed.  While some of us have indeed suggested reforms in 
Article 24, and in disciplines such as the use of anti-dumping duties on nonmembers, as ways of 
minimizing the adverse effects of the preferences that the PTAs inherently imply, the worldwide 
achievement of free trade appears to be the most effective remedy.  The reason is that preferences 
relative to zero duties are zero:  preference would be effectively killed at source. 
  Then again, a principal advantage of PTAs, which seems to attract trade-oriented businesses 
in particular, is that they offer target dates that will lead on schedule to ultimate free trade, albeit 
within a limited area.  By contrast, the GATT/WTO lurches from one Round of multilateral trade 
negotiation to another, the end of a Round never linked for sure to the start of another, as is in fact 
the case again with the end of the Uruguay Round. 
  A WTO target would thus cut through this fundamental weakness and simultaneously 
eliminate multilateralism's chief disadvantage vis-a-vis the inherently discriminatory PTAs, 
contributing to the current efforts at restoring the primacy of the WTO in the world trading system. 
  It would also set the WTO firmly on to the task of completing agenda of worldwide free 
trade, an objective which GATT pursued diligently through successive rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations and whose advantages have been demonstrated by nearly half a century of experience. 
Yours sincerely, 
Jagdish Bhagwati    Arvind Panagariya  
 
 
 16 Table 1a: Post-UR Tariff Rates: United States 
 
Products  Proportion of Imports Subject to Tariff Rates 
 
Average 
Tariff  Duty  Free 0.1-5.0  5.1-10.0  10.1-15.0 15.1-35.0 Over  35 
       
Total 3.50 39.50 42.90 10.20 1.30 6.00 0.10
Fish  and  Fish  Products
 
1.20 87.50 1.90 4.00 6.40 0.20 0.00
Wood  Products 0.50 89.50 5.60 4.80 0.10 0.00 0.00
Textiles  and  Clothing 14.60 4.90 9.20 25.90 8.00 52.00 0.00
Leather,  Rubber,  Footwear
 
7.10 12.70 33.20 47.30 2.90 1.50 2.40
Metals 1.50 59.70 30.80 8.90 0.60 0.00 0.00
Chemicals and Photographic 
Supplies 
2.80 31.50 49.10 19.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transport  Equipment 3.50 8.70 85.20 0.30 0.70 5.10 0.00
Non-electric  Machinery
 
1.00 62.80 35.00 2.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
Electric  Machinery 2.00 35.90 61.10 2.80 0.20 0.00 0.00
Minerals and Precious Stones  2.50  59.80  14.30  23.50  1.30  1.10  0.00 
Other  Manufactured  Articles' 1.50 59.40 31.30 8.80 0.40 0.10 0.00
 
               
               
             
               
               
             
             
               
               
             
               
 
Source: UNCTAD (1996) 
 
 
 17  
Table 1b: Post-UR Tariff Rates: European Union 
 
Product  Proportion of Imports Subject to Tariff Rates 
 
Average 
Tariff  Duty  Free 0.1-5.0  5.1-10.0  10.1-15.0 15.1-35.0 Over  35 
       
Total 3.60 37.70 34.20 19.00 8.20 0.90 0.00
Fish  and  Fish  Products
 
10.20 6.90 14.50 29.60 31.20 17.80
 
0.00
Wood  Products 0.70 88.50 3.00 8.50 0.00 0.0 0.00
Textiles  and  Clothing 9.10 1.30 19.10 25.50 54.10 0.00 0.00
Leather,  Rubber,  Footwear
 
5.1 24.50 40.70 23.00 0.00 11.80 0.00
Metals 1.10 73.70 19.60 6.70 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chemicals  and  Photographic  Supplies
 
  4.50 27.20 4.00 68.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transport  Equipment 6.50 23.40 15.70 59.90 0.80 0.20 0.00
Non-electric  Machinery
 
1.40 33.90 63.10 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Electric  Machinery 5.20 3.90 69.90 8.30 17.90 0.00 10
Minerals  and  Precious  Stones 0.60 85.20 10.40 3.30 1.10 0.00 0.00
Other  Manufactured  Articles 3.50 24.20 58.90 12.00 4.30 0.60 0.00
 
               
               
           
               
               
             
             
             
               
             
               
               
 
Source: UNCTAD (1996) 
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Table 1c: Post-UR Tariff Rates: Japan 
 
Product  Proportion of Imports Subject to Tariff Rates 
 
Average 
Tariff  Duty  Free 0.1-5.0  5.1-10.0  10.1-15.0 15.1-35.0 Over  35 
       
Total 1.70 71.00 16.60 9.70 2.00 0.70 0.00
Fish  and  Fish  Products
 
4.00 1.90 70.70 25.70 1.70 0.00 0.00
Wood  Products 0.70 89.20 4.30 6.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
Textiles  and  Clothing 7.60 4.50 19.10 54.70 21.50 0.20 0.00
Leather,  Rubber,  Footwear
 
8.30 40.60 0.90 34.00 2.90 21.5 0.10
Metals 0.50 84.20 14.00 1.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chemicals and Photographic 
Supplies 
1.90 47.20 49.70 3.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transport  Equipment 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non-electric  Machinery
 
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Electric  Machinery 0.10 97.30 2.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Minerals  and  Precious  Stones 0.20 94.50 3.10 2.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other  Manufactured  Articles 0.60 86.90 9.10 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 
               
               
             
               
               
             
             
               
               
             
               
               
 
Source: UNCTAD (1996) 
 
 
 19 Table 1d: Unweighted Average Percentage Post-UR Tariffs: APEC Members 















Product                      
Textiles                           
                           
                         
                           
                           
                           
                           
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                           
                         
                         
14.1 10.4 24.2 4.0 10.7 12.6 16.1 8.2 23.3 0.4 26.6 7.4 38.9
Wearing  apparel
 
37.2 16.4 29.8 9.1 13.8 14.6 17.6 31.3 26.3 3.9 22.9 15.9 39.9
Leather 14.9 10.2 12.9 12.9 9.4 9.7 18.2 25.6 25.4 0.5 28.5 6.6 43.4
Lumber 7.4 4.0 24.6 1.6 12.0 12.6 17.9 11.8 24.9 0.2 16.1 1.1 32.1
Pulp  paper 6.3 0.0 10.6 0.0 0.0 4.5 5.3 0.0 24.1 0.0 20.3 0.0 27.2
Oil  and  coal 0.9 0.5 3.7 1.4 4.2 2.5 7.1 3.0 12.7 10.7 21.1 0.8 15.5
Chemicals 7.3 6.0 5.6 2.5 6.7 8.9 6.7 7.7 17.4 0.4 30.1 3.1 28.3
Non-metallic  
mineral products 
8.4 4.8 15.1 1.4 12.3 12.0 19.3 9.5 26.4 0.0 25.8 5.2 35.2
Primary ferrous 
metals  
1.6 1.4 5.5 0.9 1.9 6.0 4.9 8.5 12.8 0.0 13.8 1.0 18.9
Non-ferrous  metals
 
  4.8 1.9 10.4 0.6 6.5 4.7 5.2 9.5 19.0 0.0 11.7 1.0 10.9
Fabricated  metals
 
10.9 4.9 20.2 0.9 11.8 12.6 13.6 13.2 30.6 0.0 31.8 2.2 34.5
Transport 9.8 4.3 15.0 0.0 11.4 8.8 14.2 12.3 22.2 0.9 41.1 2.5 69.3
Machinery 7.8 2.3 14.2 0.1 7.1 11.7 5.4 9.9 20.4 0.0 25.4 1.5 28.4
Other  manufacturing  11.6 4.2 28.6 2.3 8.8 15.4 12.6 18.1 31.1 0.3 26.8 2.7 44.4
Electricity, water and 
gas 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0
 




 20 Table 2a: Uruguay Round Tariff Bindings and Actual Tariff Equivalents of Agricultural 
Protection, 1986-2000 




















          
European Union           
Wheat 68  109  36  1.60  1.60 
Coarse Grains  89  121  36  1.42  1.36 
Rice 103  231  36  2.36  2.24 
Beef and Veal  97  87  10  1.00  0.90 
Other Meat  27  34  36  1.32  1.26 
Dairy Products  147  205  29  1.63  1.39 
Sugar 144  279  6  1.27  1.94 
All Agriculture           
Unweighted Average  45  73    1.61  1.63 
Standard Deviation  57  96    1.58  1.68 
          
United States           
Wheat 20  4  36  0.30  0.20 
Coarse Grains  2  2  74  2.00  1.00 
Rice 2  3  36  5.00  1.50 
Beef and Veal  2  26  15  10.33  13.00 
Other Meat  I  3  36  0.67  3.00 
Dairy Products  46  93  15  1.09  2.02 
Sugar 67  91  15  1.50  1.36 
All Agriculture           
Unweighted Average  13  23    1.44  1.77 
Standard Deviation  22  35    1.20  1.59 
 
a: Announced base tariff rate as a ratio of actual tariff equivalent in the base period. 
 
Source: Ingco (1995) 
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Table 2b: Unweighted Average Percentage Post-UR Tariffs in Agriculture: APEC Members 















Product                     
Paddy  rice
 
                         
                       
                         
                           
                           
                         
                        
                 
1.0 0.0 9.0 444.0  49.0 8.0 49.0 1.0 49.0 2.2 49.0 0.0 0.0
Wheat 0.0 26.0 0.0 193.0  13.0 0.0 13.0 0.0 13.0 2.7 13.0 4.0 0.0
Grains 0.0 24.0 6.0 180.0  95.0 0.0 95.0 0.0 95.0 5.3 95.0 0.0 3.0
Non-grain  crops 3.3 3.0 38.3 38.7 47.7 3.0 47.7 3.3 47.7 7.5 47.7 42.0 11.8
Processed  rice
 
0.0 7.0 0.0 36.5 41.0 0.0 41.0 0.0 41.0 3.9 41.1 2.0 0.0














Other  food 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 0.1 0.0 26.0
 
Source: The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council for APEC, 1995, Survey of Impediments to Trade and Investment in the APEC 
Region. 
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